

# Technology transfers, foreign investment and productivity spillovers: Evidence from Vietnam

Carol Newman: Trinity College Dublin

John Rand and Theodore Talbot: University of Copenhagen

Finn Tarp: University of Copenhagen and UNU-WIDER

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# Motivation

- ▶ Attracting FDI is a policy priority in many developing countries
- ▶ Aside from providing jobs and capital, FDI firms also bring new technology and knowledge
- ▶ Argument is that FDI firms are likely to be technologically superior to domestic firms
- ▶ Through their interactions, knowledge/new technology can be transferred to domestic sector leading to productivity improvements
- ▶ This can happen through many different mechanisms but these are difficult to disentangle empirically
- ▶ While the topic has received a lot of attention in the literature there is conflicting empirical evidence on the nature of spillovers and limited evidence on the underlying mechanisms

# What we do in this paper....

- ▶ Using rich firm-level panel data for Vietnam 2009-2011 we analyze various mechanisms for spillovers from foreign-invested firms to the domestic sector
  - ▶ Examine horizontal, forward and backward spillovers
  - ▶ Disentangle contractual technology transfers from FDI externalities using a firm-specific measure
  - ▶ Consider whether competition effects dominate positive externalities from FDI
  - ▶ Examine spillovers from joint-venture vs. wholly-foreign owned firms
  - ▶ Explore the role of absorptive capacity of firms in determining the extent of technology spillovers

# Preview of findings

- ▶ Forward linkages lead to productivity spillovers while backward linkages negatively impact the productivity of domestic firms  
This is contrary to other empirical studies
- ▶ Contractual technology transfers play a small role in explaining forward spillovers  
A large part of the positive spillovers we observe are unexplained
- ▶ Forward FDI externalities are from joint venture foreign firms
- ▶ Contracted technology transfers are productivity enhancing when they are linked with wholly foreign-owned upstream firms
- ▶ Increased competition from imports explains most (but not all) of the negative backward spillover from downstream FDI firms
- ▶ Absorptive capacity can cushion firms from negative backward spillovers

# Conceptual framework

- ▶ **Horizontal or intra-sector spillovers** (Caves, 1996):

FDI firm has firm-specific asset with a public good characteristic (e.g. knowledge or superior technology)

Cannot prevent it from being transferred to competing firms

E.g. through worker mobility, business or other networks, etc.

- ▶ **Vertical or inter-sector spillovers** (Rodriguez-Clare 1996):


Through the supply chain

Backward: from foreign firms to domestic input suppliers

Forward: from foreign intermediate input suppliers to domestic producers

To illustrate.....

# Conceptual framework



# Conceptual framework

## Backward spillovers:

### ▶ Positive:

- ▶ Deliberate knowledge transfer e.g. technical assistance, management experience, quality assurance (Moran 2001)
- ▶ Incentives for suppliers to improve quality of inputs (Javorcik 2004)
- ▶ Scale economies

### ▶ Negative:

- ▶ Asymmetric bargaining power (Girma et al. 2008)
- ▶ Domestic firms not suited to producing input varieties demanded by foreign firms (Rodriguez-Clare 1996)
- ▶ Increased competition from other foreign firms supplying inputs (Aitken and Harrison 1999) or from imported inputs

# Conceptual framework

## Forward spillovers:

- ▶ **Positive:**
  - ▶ Embodied technologies (Girma et al 2008)
  - ▶ Accompanying services (Javorcik 2004)
  - ▶ Competition effects
- ▶ **Negative:**
  - ▶ 'Lock-in' to using inputs purchased from FDI firms
  - ▶ Asymmetric bargaining power possible if FDI firms gain dominant position upstream
  - ▶ Cultural factors
- ▶ Forward spillovers have been very little attention in the literature...



# Empirical Evidence

## ▶ Horizontal spillovers:

- ▶ Very little empirical evidence that they exist
- ▶ Foreign-invested firms compete with domestic firms in the same sector – incentive to prevent their technology from leaking (Javorcik 2004)
- ▶ Barrios et al. (2011), Blalock and Gertler (2008), Bwalya (2006), Damijan et al. (2008), Javorcik (2004) and Kugler (2006) - none find evidence for horizontal spillovers

## ▶ Backward spillovers:

- ▶ Javorcik (2004)- Lithuania
- ▶ Blalock and Gertler (2008) – Indonesia
- ▶ Kugler (2006) - Columbia

## ▶ Forward spillovers:

- ▶ No evidence that we can find

# Other issues

- ▶ Characteristics of foreign and domestic firms may matter:
  - ▶ Javorcik (2004) – backward spillovers only evident from partially-owned foreign firms
  - ▶ Giroud et al (2012), Marin and Bell (2006) – spillovers more likely from firms that are technologically/knowledge intensive
  - ▶ Crespo and Fontoura (2007) – absorptive capacity of domestic firms matters
    - ▶ Blomstrom and Sjöholm (1999) – export status of firm
    - ▶ Aitken and Harrison (1999) – firm size
    - ▶ Marin and Bell (2006) – investments in technology and training
- ▶ Distinction between externalities and actual technology transfers:
  - ▶ Giroud et al. (2012) and Zanfei (2012) critique literature on this point
  - ▶ Smeets (2008) – technology transfers and spillovers are distinct concepts that should be considered as such in empirical analysis
  - ▶ **This is one of our key points of departure.....**

# What we test in this paper:

- ▶ Test for horizontal, forward and backward spillovers in Vietnamese case
- ▶ Test to what extent FDI spillovers are due to contract related technology transfers or externalities
- ▶ Test whether there are negative competition effects from increased imported inputs associated with FDI
- ▶ Test whether spillovers are more likely from joint-venture FDI firms and wholly-foreign owned firms
- ▶ Test whether absorptive capacity of firms plays a role in determining extent of technology spillovers

# Empirical Approach

- ▶ **Measurement of spillovers (Javorcik, 2004)**
- ▶ Horizontal spillovers: the proportion of total revenue,  $R$ , within each 4-digit sector,  $j$ , accounted for by  $k$  foreign-owned firms (firms denoted with subscript  $i$  and time with  $t$ ).

$$H_{jt} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^k R_{ijt}}{\sum_{i=1}^n R_{ijt}}$$

- ▶ Forward spillovers: the proportion of total revenue in upstream sectors accounted for by foreign-owned firms

$$F_{jt} = \sum_{u=1}^{J-1} \alpha_{ut} H_{ut}$$

$\alpha_{ut}$  is the proportion of inputs into sector  $j$  that are purchased from sector  $u$  in time  $t$  and  $H_{ut}$  is the proportion of foreign-owned firms in upstream sector  $u$ .

# Empirical Approach

- ▶ Backward spillovers: the proportion of total revenue in downstream sectors accounted for by foreign-owned firms

$$B_{jt} = \sum_{d=1}^{J-1} \alpha_{dt} H_{dt}$$

$\alpha_{dt}$  is the proportion of output from sector  $j$  that is sold to sector  $d$  in time  $t$  and  $H_{dt}$  is the proportion of foreign-owned firms in downstream sector  $d$ .

# Empirical Approach

## ► **Baseline model (Javorcik, 2004): detecting spillovers**

$$\ln Y_{ijt} = \alpha_i + \beta_l \ln L_{ijt} + \beta_k \ln K_{ijt} + \delta_H H_{jt} \\ + \delta_F F_{jt} + \delta_B B_{jt} + s_j + \tau_t + e_{ijt}$$

$Y$ : value added

$L$ : total labor input

$K$ : capital inputs

$\alpha_i$ : firm fixed effects

$s_j$ : 4-digit sector fixed effects

$\tau_t$ : time fixed effects

- How productivity of firm is correlated with foreign dominance within sectors (H), in upstream sectors (F) and in downstream sectors (B)

# Empirical Approach

## ► Detecting technology transfers:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln Y_{ijt} = & \alpha_i + \beta_l \ln L_{ijt} + \beta_k \ln K_{ijt} + \delta_H H_{jt} + \delta_B B_{jt} + \delta_F F_{jt} \\ & + \beta_{TB} tech\_back_{ijt} + \beta_{TF} tech\_for_{ijt} \\ & + \varphi_B tech\_back_{ijt} \times B_{jt} + \varphi_F tech\_for_{ijt} \times F_{jt} \\ & + s_j + \tau_t + e_{ijt} \end{aligned}$$

*tech\_back*: firm received a technology transfer from a downstream firm

*tech\_for*: firm received a technology transfer from an upstream firm

## Two Marginal Effects of interest:

$$\frac{\partial \ln Y_{ijt}}{\partial B_{jt}} = \delta_B + \varphi_B tech\_back_{ijt}$$

$$\frac{\partial \ln Y_{ijt}}{\partial F_{jt}} = \delta_F + \varphi_F tech\_for_{ijt}$$

$\varphi_B$ : backward FDI spillovers due to direct technology transfers

$\varphi_F$ : forward FDI spillovers due to direct technology transfers

$\delta_B$ : backward FDI spillovers due to externalities

$\delta_F$ : forward FDI spillovers due to externalities

# Empirical Approach

- ▶ Netting out competition effects
  - ▶ Add interaction term between Backward Linkages and level of imports into the sector to control for extent of upstream competition
  - ▶ Marginal effect can be computed for different levels of imports

$$\frac{\partial \ln Y_{ijt}}{\partial B_{jt}} = \delta_B + \varphi_{Btech\_back_{ijt}} + \delta_{imp} imports$$

- ▶ Disaggregation by type of ownership
  - ▶ Disaggregate  $B$  and  $F$  into proportion of foreign firms that are 100% foreign owned and proportion that are joint ventures.
- ▶ Absorptive capacity of domestic firms
  - ▶ Add interaction terms between spillovers, technology transfers and measures of absorptive capacity



# Vietnamese Context

- ▶ The opening up of the Vietnamese economy began in 1986 with the adoption of a range of policy measures under *doi moi* (renovation) in particular relating to trade liberalisation and the promotion of foreign direct investment (FDI)
- ▶ FDI promotion a gradual process with successive revisions to investment laws between late 1980s and mid-2000s.

**Table 1:** Regional and sector level contribution of foreign investors to output and employment

	2009	2010	2011
Output contribution (%)			
All manufacturing	43.02	44.51	47.31
15: Food products and bev.	32.91	30.84	33.84
19: Tanning/dressing leather	80.06	80.92	84.15
20: Wood and wood products	18.67	17.97	18.13
33: Medical, precision and opt.	93.11	88.25	86.11
Employment contribution (%)			
All manufacturing	43.77	44.97	48.71
15: Food products and bev.	17.22	17.65	19.49
19: Tanning/dressing leather	71.90	73.52	77.70
20: Wood and wood products	12.31	12.03	13.73
33: Medical, precision and opt.	80.78	81.74	86.71

# Data

- ▶ Technology and Competitiveness Survey (TCS) 2009-2011
- ▶ Sample of more than 7,500 firms
- ▶ Vietnamese Enterprise Survey 2002- 2011
- ▶ Population of all registered enterprises in Vietnam with 30 employees or more and representative sample of smaller firms
- ▶ TCS implemented by GSO as part of Vietnam Enterprise Survey and so data can be combined
- ▶ Supply Use Tables for Vietnam in 2007 to measure proportion of inputs/outputs traded between sectors
- ▶ Export and import data at 4-digit level taken from COMTRADE – control variables

# Results

## **Baseline model: detecting spillovers**

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Dependent Variable: lnY

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lnlab 0.518\*\*\*

lncap 0.223\*\*\*

### *FDI Spillovers:*

Horizontal -0.0001

Forward 0.0048\*\*\*

Backward -0.0073\*\*\*

R<sup>2</sup> 0.803

Firms 7,767

Obs 17,497

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## Detecting technology transfers:

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Dependent Variable: lnY

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### *FDI Spillovers:*

Horizontal	-0.0001	-0.0001
Forward	0.0047***	0.0043***
Backward	-0.0074**	-0.0074***

Large part of spillover  
still unexplained.....

### *Tech Transfers:*

Tech_for	0.0244***	-0.0019
Tech_back	0.0036	-0.0225

### *Interactions:*

FDI For*Tech_for		0.0009**
FDI Back*Tech_back		0.0007

R <sup>2</sup>	0.803	0.803
Firms	7,767	7,767
Obs	17,497	17,497

---

## Detecting technology transfers:

---

Dependent Variable: lnY

---

### *FDI Spillovers:*

Horizontal	-0.0001	-0.0001
Forward	0.0047***	0.0043***
Backward	-0.0074**	-0.0074***

### *Tech Transfers:*

Tech_for	<div>- Asymmetric bargaining power - Capabilities - Import competition</div>
Tech_back	

### *Interactions:*

FDI For*Tech_for	0.0009**
FDI Back*Tech_back	0.0007

R <sup>2</sup>	0.803	0.803
Firms	7,767	7,767
Obs	17,497	17,497

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## Netting out competition effects:

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Dependent Variable: lnY

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### *FDI Spillovers:*

Horizontal	-0.0001
Forward	0.0039**
Backward	-0.0055**

### *Tech Transfers:*

Tech_for	-0.0024
Tech_back	0.0038


### *Interactions:*

FDI For*Tech_for	0.0009**
FDI Back *imports	-0.0001**

R <sup>2</sup>	0.803
Firms	7,767
Obs	17,497

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Competition effects  
only explains part  
of the negative  
backward spillover





## Disaggregation by type of ownership: Joint ventures vs. Wholly foreign-owned

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Dependent Variable: lnY

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### *FDI Spillovers:*

FDI Horizontal	-0.00001	-0.0000
FDI For 100%	0.0025	0.0018
FDI For JV	0.0116***	0.0125***
FDI Back 100%	-0.0088***	-0.0090***
FDI Back JV	-0.0031	-0.0036
Tech Transfers		
Tech_for	0.0235***	0.0045
Tech_back	0.0036	-0.0265

Externalities associated  
with joint ventures

### *Interactions:*

FDI For 100%*Tech_for		0.0014***
FDI For JV*Tech_for		-0.0029
FDI Back 100% *Tech_back		0.0005
FDI Back JV*Tech_back		0.0017

Tech transfers associated  
with 100% foreign owned  
firms

R <sup>2</sup>	0.802	0.803
Firms	7,767	7,767
Obs	17,497	17,497

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## Disaggregation by type of ownership: Joint ventures vs. Wholly foreign-owned

---

Dependent Variable: lnY

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### *FDI Spillovers:*

FDI Horizontal	-0.00001	-0.0000
FDI For 100%	0.0025	0.0018
FDI For JV	0.0116***	0.0125***
FDI Back 100%	-0.0088***	-0.0090***
FDI Back JV	-0.0031	-0.0036

### *Tech Transfers:*

Tech_for	0.0235***	0.0045
Tech_back	0.0036	-0.0265

### *Interactions*

FDI For 100%*Tech_for		0.0014***
FDI For JV*Tech_for		-0.0029
FDI Back 100% *Tech_back		0.0005
FDI Back JV*Tech_back		0.0017

R <sup>2</sup>	0.802	0.803
Firms	7,767	7,767
Obs	17,497	17,497

---

Negative backward  
spillovers associated  
with 100% foreign  
owned firms

## Disaggregation by type of ownership:

Joint ventures vs. Wholly foreign-owned

Netting out competition effects:

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Dependent Variable: lnY

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### *FDI Spillovers:*

FDI Horizontal	0.0001
FDI For 100%	0.0020
FDI For JV	0.0108***
FDI Back 100%	-0.0070***
FDI Back JV	-0.0034

### *Tech Transfers:*

Tech_for	0.0067
Tech_back	0.0039

### *Interactions:*

FDI For 100% * Tech_for	0.0014***
FDI For JV * Tech_for	-0.0032
FDI Back 100% * imports	-0.0001*
FDI Back JV * imports	-0.0001

R <sup>2</sup>	0.803
Firms	7,767
Obs	17,497

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Only partly  
explained by  
competition effects

# Absorptive capacity

- ▶ Include interaction terms between indicators of absorptive capacity of firms and spillover measures
  - ▶ New Machinery
  - ▶ New ICT
  - ▶ Process Innovation
  - ▶ Quality Innovation
  - ▶ Expand Variety
  - ▶ Expand Product
  - ▶ Switch Sector
  - ▶ Tech Adaptation
  - ▶ R&D
- ▶ No evidence of any impact of absorptive capacity on spillovers through forward linkages
- ▶ For backward linkages 3 measures emerge as potentially important for lessening negative impact
  - ▶ Investment in ICT, Variety innovation, Technology Adaptation

## Absorptive capacity: investment in ICT

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Dependent Variable: lnY

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### *FDI Spillovers:*

Horizontal	-0.0001	-0.0001
Forward	0.0047***	0.0046***
Backward	-0.0074***	-0.0074***

### *Absorptive capacity:*

ICT investment	-0.0030	-0.0215
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### *Interactions:*

FDI For*ICT		-0.0004
FDI Back*ICT		0.0008**

R <sup>2</sup>	0.803	0.803
Firms	7,767	7,767
Obs	17,497	17,497

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## Absorptive capacity: Variety Innovation

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Dependent Variable: lnY

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### *FDI Spillovers:*

Horizontal	-0.0002	-0.0002
Forward	0.0047***	0.0046***
Backward	-0.0074***	-0.0077***

### *Absorptive capacity:*

Process Innovation	0.0045	-0.0037
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### *Interactions:*

FDI For*Process Innov		0.0001
FDI Back*Process Innov		0.0010*

R <sup>2</sup>	0.803	0.803
Firms	7,767	7,767
Obs	17,497	17,497

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## Absorptive capacity: Technology Adaptation

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Dependent Variable: lnY

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### *FDI Spillovers:*

Horizontal	-0.0001	-0.0002
Forward	0.0047***	0.0045***
Backward	-0.0074***	-0.0074***

### *Absorptive capacity:*

Process Innovation	-0.0011	-0.0382
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### *Interactions:*

FDI For*Process Innov		-0.0002
FDI Back*Process Innov		0.0012*

R <sup>2</sup>	0.803	0.803
Firms	7,767	7,767
Obs	17,497	17,497

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# Robustness checks

- ▶ Estimate productivity using Olley and Pakes (1996) approach and use two-stage approach
- ▶ Estimate model removing outliers
- ▶ Estimate model for balanced panel
- ▶ Control for the sector level concentration (Amiti and Konings, 2007)
- ▶ This allows us disentangle real productivity effects from changes in mark-ups



# Conclusions

- ▶ There are FDI spillovers in the case of Vietnam that provide benefits beyond those internalized through market transactions
- ▶ These occur through forward spillovers from foreign input-suppliers based in Vietnam to domestic Vietnamese firms
- ▶ There is a distinction between *externalities* and *technology transfers* but even after controlling for technology transfers a large part of FDI spillovers remains unexplained
- ▶ Specifically:
  - ▶ Forward spillovers:
  - ▶ JVs create productivity *externalities* that filter along the supply chain
  - ▶ Wholly foreign-owned projects only enhance the productivity of domestic customers where there is a contractual obligation to transfer knowledge
  - ▶ Backward spillovers:
  - ▶ Negative spillovers are due to wholly foreign-owned firms
  - ▶ Only part of this is explained by negative competition effects
  - ▶ Domestic firms that invest in ICT, new varieties or technology adaptation experience less of a negative backward spillover

Thank you

Questions and comments most welcome